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MEASURING POLICE BODY CAMERA
INFRASTRUCTURE
Ronald J. Coleman*
Police body cameras have been in ascendancy since at least the
2014 deaths of Eric Garner and Michael Brown, and body cameras are
poised to play an increasing role in law enforcement following the more
recent deaths of George Floyd, Daunte Wright, and others. Indeed,
President Biden, himself, has repeatedly called for the passage of the
George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, which would require
federal law enforcement officers to wear a body camera.
Notwithstanding their ascendancy, important empirical questions on
body cameras persist. For instance, do local law enforcement agencies
have adequate infrastructure to support body camera programs? If not,
what areas should policy-makers target in order to increase the
adequacy of local agency infrastructure? And, are certain groups of
agencies doing better with body camera infrastructure than others?
Answering these and related questions requires accurate measurement
of phenomena that are extremely challenging to measure. This Article
presents what appears to be a first-of-its-kind multidimensional measure
of local U.S. law enforcement body camera infrastructure: the Police
Body Camera Infrastructure Index (“BCII”). Analysis of the BCII offers
three primary contributions. First, it provides a broad summary of over
1,100 local agencies’ inadequacy in body camera infrastructure based
on a large-N dataset. Second, it isolates the specific factors which drive
agency inadequacy. Third, since countrywide averages have the
potential to mask important differences across agencies, it reveals the
position of certain agency subgroups based on size and location. It is
hoped that this Article will inform policy-makers and local stakeholders
in improving body camera programs, highlight the value of
measurement in formulating such policy decisions, and spur continued
research into body camera programs.

* Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A twenty-year-old African American man is out on a Sunday
afternoon with his girlfriend.1 He is driving to his brother’s house when
police allegedly pull him over for an expired tag.2 Officers apparently
learn that the man has an outstanding warrant.3 Released body camera
footage appears to reflect the man—outside his car and with arms behind
his back—with an officer behind him attempting to handcuff him.4 An
officer tells the man, “don’t,” before the man twists away and re-enters
his vehicle.5 Footage appears to reflect an officer warning the man she
will use her Taser, then repeatedly shouting, “Taser! Taser! Taser!”6
Then the officer screams: “Holy [expletive]! I just shot him.”7 The
vehicle’s door closes, and the man drives away.8 The vehicle apparently

1. Amir Vera et al., Protests and police clash in third night of protests after death of
Daunte Wright, CNN (Apr. 14, 2021, 1:40 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/13/us/dauntewright-minnesota-shooting-tuesday/index.html; What to Know About the Death of Daunte
Wright, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/daunte-wright-deathminnesota.html [hereinafter Death of Daunte Wright].
2. Vera et al., supra note 1; Death of Daunte Wright, supra note 1.
3. Vera et al., supra note 1; Death of Daunte Wright, supra note 1.
4. Vera et al., supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Vera et al., supra note 1; Death of Daunte Wright, supra note 1.
7. Vera et al., supra note 1; Death of Daunte Wright, supra note 1.
8. Vera et al., supra note 1; Death of Daunte Wright, supra note 1.
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crashes some blocks away, and the man passes away.9 The man was
Daunte Wright, and his death and accompanying body camera footage
led to multiple nights of protests.10
The Wright protests in April 2021—which recalled those sparked
by George Floyd’s death in May 2020—took place only around ten miles
away from where Officer Derek Chauvin was on trial for Floyd’s death.11
The world had also been able to watch via video footage as Floyd had
been pinned to the ground, with a knee on his neck, and uttered his final
words: “I can’t breathe.”12 After Chauvin was found guilty of Floyd’s
murder in April 2021, President Biden said of Floyd’s final words: “We
cannot let them die with him. We have to keep hearing them. . . . We
have a chance to begin to change the trajectory in this country.”13 The
events surrounding the deaths of George Floyd, Daunte Wright, and
others have kept police reform at the fore, and camera footage has played
a key role in several such incidents.14 Indeed, President Biden, himself,
9.
10.
11.
12.

Vera et al., supra note 1; Death of Daunte Wright, supra note 1.
Vera et al., supra note 1; Death of Daunte Wright, supra note 1.
Vera et al., supra note 1; Death of Daunte Wright, supra note 1.
See, e.g., Evan Hill et al., How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y.
TIMES
(May
31,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floydinvestigation.html; Eric Levenson, Here’s what happened to George Floyd from every
perspective
and
angle,
CNN
(Apr.
5,
2021,
9:28
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/05/us/george-floyd-video-angle/index.html; George Floyd:
What happened in the final moments of his life, BBC NEWS (July 16, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52861726; Meredith Deliso, Timeline: The
impact of George Floyd’s death in Minneapolis and beyond, ABC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2021,
12:35
PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/timeline-impact-george-floyds-deathminneapolis/story?id=70999322.
13. See Remarks by President Biden on the Verdict in the Derek Chauvin Trial for the
Death of George Floyd, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 20, 2021, 7:11 PM),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/20/remarks-bypresident-biden-on-the-verdict-in-the-derek-chauvin-trial-for-the-death-of-george-floyd/;
‘Justice’ but still ‘a long way to go’: Reaction to Chauvin conviction, REUTERS (Apr. 20,
2021,
3:31
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-race-georgefloyd-voicesquotes/justice-but-still-a-long-way-to-go-reaction-to-chauvin-conviction-idUSKBN2C7334;
Katie Rogers, ‘It was a murder in full light of day,’ President Biden says of George Floyd’s
death, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/20/us/presidentbiden-comments-derek-chauvin-verdict.html (noting President Biden’s statement of George
Floyd’s death: “[i]t was a murder in full light of day, and it ripped the blinders off for the
whole world to see.”).
14. See, e.g., Tim Arango, New body camera footage shows George Floyd handcuffed
on the street, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/13/us/georgefloyd-bodycam-footage.html (George Floyd); Death of Daunte Wright, supra note 1 (Daunte
Wright); Josh Marcus, ‘She was scared’: New bodycam video raises questions in Breonna
Taylor
case,
INDEPENDENT
(Oct.
8,
2020,
12:18
AM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/new-body-camera-footagepolicebreonna-taylor-b870319.html (Breonna Taylor); Brandon Tensley, Ahmaud Arbery and the
resilience of black protest, CNN (May 12, 2020, 8:54 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/
05/12/politics/ahmaud-arbery-black-protest-pandemic/index.html (Ahmaud Arbery); Peter
Nickeas et al., Chicago police say bodycam footage shows less than a second passes from
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has repeatedly called for the passage of the George Floyd Justice in
Policing Act of 2021, which would require, among other things, federal
law enforcement officers to wear a body camera.15
Police body-worn camera (“BWC”) use has been in ascendency
since the protests following the highly-publicized deaths of Michael
Brown and Eric Garner in 2014, and the recent wave of renewed protests
for George Floyd and others seems set to continue or accelerate this
rise.16 BWC advocates have argued that BWCs have myriad benefits,
such as increasing accountability, improving behavior, and reducing
citizen complaints.17 Critics have raised concerns that the cameras are
costly and could lead to unfairness or erosion of privacy.18 The ongoing
normative debates on BWCs have also been accompanied by empirical
study, as researchers and stakeholders have sought to understand the
actual efficacy and impact of BWCs.19 Missing from this empirical

when 13-year-old is seen holding a handgun and is shot by officer, CNN (Apr. 16, 2021, 8:08
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/15/us/adam-toledo-police-shooting-body-camera/
index.html (Adam Toledo); Will Wright, California Man Dies After Officers Pin Him to
Ground for 5 Minutes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/27/us/
mario-gonzalez-alameda-police.html (Mario Gonzalez).
15. See George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2021, H.R. 1280, 117th Cong.
§§ 371-372 (2021) (noting relevant part of bill “may be cited as the ‘Federal Police Camera
and Accountability Act’ ” ); Rogers, supra note 13 (noting that the bill was co-authored by
Vice President Kamala Harris). A day after the Chauvin verdict, Attorney General Merrick
Garland also announced an investigation of the Minneapolis police. See Katie Benner,
Attorney General Merrick Garland announces an investigation into the Minneapolis Police
Department, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/21/us/justicedepartment-investigation-minneapolis-police.html (“Such investigations are often the
precursors to court-approved deals between the Justice Department and local governments
that create and enforce a road map for training and operational changes.”). This was not the
only such investigation. See Jessica Schneider et al., Garland announces Justice Department
investigation into the Louisville Police Department, CNN (Apr. 27, 2021, 10:01 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/26/politics/justice-department-investigation-louisville-policedepartment/index.html (“The impending probe will come a little over a year after officers with
the department shot and killed Breonna Taylor, a 26-year-old aspiring nurse, in her own home
during a botched raid.”); Pete Williams & Adam Edelman, Justice Department launches
investigation into Louisville policing practices, NBC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2021, 10:23 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/justice-department/justice-department-launchinvestigation-louisville-pd-s-policing-practices-n1265400. The New York Times has referred
to “the use of body cameras among law enforcement in the United States” as the “rule rather
than the exception.” Richard Fausset & Giulia McDonnell Nieto del Rio, As Body Cameras
Become Commonplace, a Debate Over When to Release the Footage, N.Y. TIMES (May 2,
2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/02/us/police-body-cameras-andrew-brown-northcarolina.html.
16. See infra Part II.A; Ronald J. Coleman, Police Body Cameras: Go Big or Go Home?,
68 BUFF. L. REV. 1353, 1355 (2020).
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. Id.
19. See infra Part II.A; Coleman, supra note 16, at 1355.
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study is sufficient measurement of law enforcement body camera
infrastructure, and this Article helps to fill that gap.
This Article presents what appears to be a first-of-its-kind
multidimensional measure of local U.S. law enforcement body camera
infrastructure: the Police Body Camera Infrastructure Index (“BCII”).20
Analysis of the BCII offers three primary contributions. First, it provides
a broad summary of over 1,100 local agencies’ inadequacy in body
camera infrastructure based on a large-N dataset. Second, it isolates the
specific factors which drive agency inadequacy.
Third, since
countrywide averages have the potential to mask important differences
across agencies, it reveals the position of certain agency subgroups based
on size and location. It is hoped that this Article will inform
policy-makers and local stakeholders in improving body camera
programs, highlight the value of measurement in formulating such policy
decisions, and spur continued research into body camera programs.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part II will
provide background on body cameras, including a discussion of their
rise, as well as perceived benefits and concerns associated with their use.
Part III will set out the Article’s methodology. Part IV will present the
Article’s empirical findings. Finally, Part V will conclude and note areas
for further research.
II. BODY CAMERA BACKGROUND
BWCs are small cameras placed on an officer’s person, which may
capture what the officer sees or does.21 They may be positioned in
20. The BCII methodology is adapted from Sabina Alkire and James Foster’s Adjusted
Headcount Ratio. See generally Ronald J. Coleman & Ana Vaz, Law and Multidimensional
Measurement, 44 S. ILL. U. L.J. 253 (2020) (discussing Adjusted Headcount Ratio and
Alkire-Foster method); infra Part III.
21. Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits, 68
ALA. L. REV. 395, 398 (2016) (“Body cameras . . . are capable of going everywhere police
can go to record what the officer sees and does.”) [hereinafter Fan, Public Disclosure]; Mindy
Lawrence, Lights, Camera, Action: The Age of Body Cameras in Law Enforcement and the
Effects of Implementing Body Camera Programs in Rural Communities, 91 N.D. L. REV. 611,
615 (2015) (“Body cameras are small recording devices . . . which record the officer’s actions
and conversations with members of the public.”); Connie Felix Chen, Freeze, You’re on
Camera: Can Body Cameras Improve American Policing on the Streets and at the Borders?,
48 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 141, 156 (2017) (“[T]he cameras capture both video and
audio recordings of interactions from the officer’s perspective. The majority of systems also
come with a cloud-based data storage service . . . .”); Dru S. Letourneau, Police Body
Cameras: Implementation with Caution, Forethought, and Policy, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 439,
442 (2015) (“Police body cameras are compact devices that can create both audio and visual
records of police officer actions, observations, and interactions with the public.”); Mitch
Zamoff, Assessing the Impact of Police Body Camera Evidence on the Litigation of Excessive
Force Cases, 54 GA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2019) (“Bodycams are unique because of their placement,
which provides a real-time, first-person perspective on officer-civilian interactions.”).
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different areas on the officer, such as on an officer’s uniform or
headgear.22 BWCs might be used to, for instance, capture the interaction
of civilians and the police, with the camera footage helping to provide
“clarity on what exactly occurred during such an interaction.”23
These cameras vary in configuration and price—with many now
offering cloud storage—and the technology continues to evolve.24 For
instance, Axon Enterprise, Inc. (previously TASER International, Inc.)
is a leading provider of BWCs in the United States.25 In late 2020, Axon
unveiled “new features intended to help law enforcement supervisors
better monitor officers and curb problematic behavior.”26
A
“centerpiece” of these features was the “ ‘ Priority-Ranked Video Audit’
software,” which Axon said helped “supervisors sift through the
thousands of hours of body cam footage” many received on a “weekly
basis to zero in on potential abuses of power.”27

22. Jeffrey Bellin & Shevarma Pemberton, Policing the Admissibility of Body Camera
Evidence, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1425, 1429-30 (2019) (noting the cameras are sufficiently
versatile and small such that they may be “worn almost anywhere” on an officer’s person);
Lawrence, supra note 21, at 615 (“Body cameras . . . are positioned either on the front of an
officer’s uniform or headgear . . . .”); Fan, Public Disclosure, supra note 21, at 398 (“Body
cameras [may be worn] at an officer’s eye level, head level, or chest . . . .”); Danielle Evans,
Police Body Cameras: Mending Fences and How Pittsburgh is a Leading Example, 16 U.
PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 76, 76 (2015) (mentioning body cameras may even be affixed to
specially designed sunglasses).
23. Evans, supra note 22, at 76.
24. Chen, supra note 21, at 156 (noting variation in pricing and that “majority of
systems” come with “a cloud-based data storage service”); Letourneau, supra note 21, at
442-43 (referencing “differences among available devices”); Zamoff, supra note 21, at 9
(“The technology is continuing to evolve in an effort to improve, among other features, the
camera’s overall field of vision, night vision capabilities, and picture stability.”).
25. See Product Catalog, AXON, https://www.axon.com/products/cameras (last visited
July 7, 2021) (showing cameras); Chen, supra note 21, at 173 (noting offer of free body
cameras from Axon in 2017); Bellin & Pemberton, supra note 22, at 1431 (same); Zamoff,
supra note 21, at 9 (listing “COBAN, Motorola, Panasonic, Pinnacle, Utility, PRO-VISION,
and Axon” as manufacturers and noting Axon “is the largest supplier of body cams in America
today”); Chauncey Alcorn, Police body cam maker unveils new features it hopes will curb
officer misconduct, CNN (Oct. 28, 2020, 9:14 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/28/
tech/axon-body-cam-new-features/index.html (referring to Axon as “[t]he nation’s leading
provider of police body cameras”); see also MICHAEL D. WHITE, POLICE OFFICER
BODY-WORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE 12 n.2 (2014) (“[T]he manufacturers
most commonly cited in the identified literature and media sources were, by far, VIEVU and
TASER International.”).
26. Alcorn, supra note 25; Press Release, Axon, Axon’s Sprint for Justice Initiative
Delivers New Product Features Focused on Transparency, Truth and Officer Development
(Oct. 28, 2020), https://investor.axon.com/2020-10-28-Axons-Sprint-for-Justice-InitiativeDelivers-New-Product-Features-Focused-on-Transparency,-Truth-and-OfficerDevelopment.
27. Alcorn, supra note 25.
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A. Body Camera Ascendancy
Commenters have pointed to several developments which may have
encouraged body camera adoption.28 Several of the more important
developments are treated here.
In August 2013, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York issued its Floyd v. City of New York opinion, which concerned
the use of “stop and frisk” by the N.Y. Police Department.29 The court
noted that more than 80% of “stops between January 2004 and June 2012
. . . were of blacks or Hispanics,” and found certain Constitutional
violations.30 Importantly, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin ordered several
remedies, including a trial program for body cameras in New York City
boroughs.31
The deaths of Eric Garner and Michael Brown in the summer of
2014 may have heightened calls for body camera use. According to
news sources, video depicted an officer grabbing Eric Garner in a
chokehold and Garner repeating “I can’t breathe” before passing away.32
Michael Brown was an eighteen-year-old male fatally shot by an officer
in Ferguson, Missouri.33 Some have argued that the public outcry in the
28. See, e.g., infra Part II.A. Much of the body camera background discussed in this Part
II was also recounted in Coleman, supra note 16, at 1358-63.
29. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
30. Id. at 556-63 (discussing violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
31. Id. at 563 (ordering, among other things “a trial program requiring the use of bodyworn cameras in one precinct per [New York City] borough. . . .”); see also Kyle J. Maury,
Police Body-Worn Camera Policy: Balancing the Tension Between Privacy and Public Access
in State Law, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 485 (2015) (“In 2013, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York ordered ‘a trial program requiring the use of
body-worn cameras in one precinct per borough’ when it ruled in a § 1983 class action claim
alleging New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The court recognized the reasons why body camera recordings can play a vital
role in resolving the constitutionality of criminal procedures . . . .”) (footnotes omitted); Seth
W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (2018) (“Having
video footage of officers’ interactions with civilians, Judge Scheindlin wrote, ‘will serve a
variety of useful functions.’ ” ); Laurent Sacharoff & Sarah Lustbader, Who Should Own
Police Body Camera Videos?, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 267, 282 (2017). Earlier in her opinion,
Judge Scheindlin also stated “[b]ecause there is no contemporaneous recording of the stop
(such as could be achieved through the use of a body-worn camera), I am relegated to finding
facts based on the often conflicting testimony of eyewitnesses.” Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at
562.
32. Associated Press, From Eric Garner’s death to firing of NYPD officer: A timeline of
key events, USA TODAY (Aug. 20, 2019, 10:32 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
2019/08/20/eric-garner-timelinechokehold-death-daniel-pantaleo-fired/2059708001/ (noting
the confrontation was caught on “amateur video”); Deborah Bloom & Jareen Imam, New York
man dies after chokehold by police, CNN (Dec. 8, 2014, 5:31 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2014/07/20/justice/ny-chokehold-death/index.html (noting Garner’s
“cries [were] muffled into the pavement.”).
33. Alberto R. Gonzales & Donald Q. Cochran, Police-Worn Body Cameras: An
Antidote to the “Ferguson Effect”?, 82 MO. L. REV. 299, 300 (2017) (noting officer Darren
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wake of these and other high-profile incidents—as well as the “Black
Lives Matter” protests and movement—encouraged further use of body
cameras.34
Wilson killed Brown); Michael Brown: Ferguson officer won’t be charged for 2014 killing,
BBC NEWS (July 31, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-53603923 (“Brown
. . . suffer[ed] at least seven gunshot wounds . . . .”); Timeline of events in shooting of Michael
Brown in Ferguson, AP NEWS (Aug. 8, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/
9aa32033692547699a3b61da8fd1fc62 (“After words were exchanged, the white officer
confronted the 18-year-old Brown, who was black. . . . The officer shot and killed Brown,
who was unarmed.”); Iesha S. Nunes, Hands Up, Don’t Shoot: Police Misconduct and the
Need for Body Cameras, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1811, 1814 (2016) (“The event that occurred in
Ferguson is only one of many that law enforcement’s use of body cameras could have
prevented, or, at the very least, easily cleared up.”).
34. Maury, supra note 31, at 480 (noting “implementation of police body-worn cameras”
was at the “forefront”); Stoughton, supra note 31, at 1364-65 (discussing video footage and
the Brown shooting, stating it was “among the first in a series of violent incidents that attracted
public scrutiny and widespread criticism of the police.”); Lawrence, supra note 21, at 614-15
(noting law enforcement and civilians began to discuss the need for body cameras after the
deaths of Garner and Brown, and stating, “[i]n both instances, police discretion on the use of
force was critiqued . . . ?”); David K. Bakardjiev, Officer Body-Worn Cameras—Capturing
Objective Evidence with Quality Technology and Focused Policies, 56 JURIMETRICS J. 79, 79
(2015) (“The high-profile deaths of Eric Garner and Michael Brown by police officers have
provoked a national outcry for greater measures in police accountability.”); Chris Pagliarella,
Police Body-Worn Camera Footage: A Question of Access, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 533,
533 (2016) (noting even Brown’s parents campaigned “vigorously” for body cameras on
every officer); Letourneau, supra note 21, at 441 (“Had Officer Wilson been wearing a body
camera during his interaction with Mr. Brown, there would have been a digital record of the
event.”); Evans, supra note 22, at 76 (mentioning Brown, Garner, and Freddie Gray in
connection with calls for greater accountability through body cameras); Karson Kampfe,
Police-Worn Body Cameras: Balancing Privacy and Accountability Through State and Police
Department Action, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1154-55 (2015) (“Michael Brown—an unarmed,
black eighteen-year-old male—was shot and killed by a white police officer in Ferguson,
Missouri. . . . Situations calling police conduct into question have gained increased media
attention in the United States, especially when minority victims are involved. Notoriously
inaccurate eyewitness testimony—as well as inherently self-serving officer testimony—are
both unreliable methods of obtaining a true picture of events as they unfolded. To shield
themselves from unwarranted accusations and build trust with their communities, police
departments throughout the country have rapidly begun to adopt the use of police-worn body
cameras [] to create an objective audio and video record of officer interactions with the
public.”) (footnotes omitted); Bellin & Pemberton, supra note 22, at 1430-31 (“The Police
Executive Research Forum, in conjunction with COPS, conducted a survey in July 2013 that
revealed that fewer than 25% of responding law enforcement agencies used body cameras.
That changed dramatically following the August 2014 shooting of Michael Brown in
Ferguson, Missouri.”) (footnote omitted); Katie Farden, Recording a New Frontier in
Evidence-Gathering: Police Body-Worn Cameras and Privacy Doctrines in Washington
State, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 271, 273 (2016) (“A grand jury’s decision not to indict Wilson
for Brown’s death ignited civilian clashes with police in Brown’s home city of Ferguson,
Missouri, so severe that windows shattered, buildings blazed, tear gas sprayed, and rubber
bullets flew.”); Ethan Thomas, The Privacy Case for Body Cameras: The Need for a PrivacyCentric Approach to Body Camera Policymaking, 50 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 191, 192
(2017) (discussing “unrest and controversy over police tactics in Ferguson, Missouri. . . .”);
Roseanna Sommers, Will Putting Cameras on Police Reduce Polarization?, 125 YALE L.J.
1304, 1307-09 (2016) (discussing Brown, Garner, and the Black Lives Matter movement, and
stating, “advocates for reform have enthusiastically embraced the idea of putting cameras on
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In 2014, President Barack Obama “proposed a $263 million
spending package to increase the use of body cameras,” and this
“included a $75 million package to aid local governments with
implementation costs.”35 In 2015, the Justice Department announced the
“$20 million Body-Worn Camera Pilot Partnership Program as part of a
$75 million investment in law enforcement agencies.”36 Attorney
General Loretta Lynch described body cameras as holding “tremendous

police officers”); Matthew A. De Stasio, Comment, A Municipal Speech Claim Against Body
Camera Video Restrictions, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 961, 962 (2018) (“Ever since the rapid
expansion of body camera programs following highly publicized police shootings
(particularly the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, in the summer of 2014),
state legislatures across the country have rushed to decide who should have access to the
collected video and how to limit its public release.”); V. Noah Gimbel, Note, Body Cameras
and Criminal Discovery, 104 Geo. L.J. 1581, 1582-83 (2016) (“The Black Lives Matter
movement, largely formed and fueled in response to mounting African-American deaths at
police hands, has drawn global attention to issues of racial justice unseen since the Civil Rights
Movement. And calls for reform have reverberated all the way to the White House. Among
the policy vehicles for enhancing police accountability, the use of body-worn cameras
(BWCs) by police officers has been one of the most widely advocated, garnering the support
of nearly 90% of Americans.”) (footnotes omitted); Morgan A. Birck, Do You See What I
See? Problems with Juror Bias in Viewing Body-Camera Video Evidence, 24 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 153, 154 (2018) (“A revolution occurred in policing after the shooting of Michael Brown
in Ferguson, Missouri. . . . Most significantly, Brown’s death ignited a deeper conversation in
the United States about police violence and particularly the racial disparities in use-of-force.”)
(footnote omitted); Considering Police Body Cameras, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1794, 1795 (2015)
[hereinafter Considering Cameras] (“The hope was that video recordings of police-civilian
interactions would deter officer misconduct and eliminate the ambiguity present in cases like
Michael Brown’s, making it easier to punish officers’ use of excessive force.”); Zamoff, supra
note 21, at 10 (“In the wake of the Michael Brown shooting, prominent civil rights groups
called for police departments to equip their officers with bodycams.”).
35. Bellin & Pemberton, supra note 22, at 1431; Sacharoff & Lustbader, supra note 31,
at 280; Sommers, supra note 34, at 1307 (“In December 2014, President Obama announced
the Body Worn Camera Partnership Program, a new initiative to purchase fifty thousand body
cameras for use by police officers across the country.”); Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body
Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to Record the Police, 104 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1565 (2016)
(“Since mid-2014, at least thirty-six states have proposed some form of legislation involving
police-worn cameras, and President Obama has announced a three-year, $263 million
investment in body cameras.”); Kami Chavis Simmons, Body-Mounted Police Cameras: A
Primer on Police Accountability vs. Privacy, 58 HOW. L.J. 881, 883 (2015) (“President
Obama announced that $75 million of federal money would be made available for local law
enforcement to purchase and train officers to use body cameras.”); Birck, supra note 34, at
154-55; Zamoff, supra note 21, at 11. President Obama also established a new task force
relating to policing. Simmons, supra, at 882 (“In the wake of these deaths [Michael Brown
and Eric Gardner] and others, President Obama signed an order establishing the President’s
Task Force on 21st Century Policing, a body of scholars, practitioners, and policymakers that
would examine ways to improve distrust between communities and police.”).
36. Bellin & Pemberton, supra note 22, at 1431; Sacharoff & Lustbader, supra note 31,
at 280-81.
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promise.”37 The American Civil Liberties Union and certain other
groups also appeared at least somewhat supportive of body cameras.38
This growing support for body cameras may also have been
encouraged by findings from early empirical studies.39 In particular, a
frequently referenced Rialto, California study suggested officers
wearing cameras were the objects of substantially fewer complaints and
greatly reduced their use of force.40 Other early studies also appeared to
have offered at least certain encouraging results.41
37. Sacharoff & Lustbader, supra note 31, at 280; see also Gimbel, supra note 34, at
1584.
38. Sacharoff & Lustbader, supra note 31, at 280-82 (“The ACLU has characterized
body cameras as ‘a win for all,’ as long as privacy safeguards are implemented.”); Sommers,
supra note 34, at 1310 (discussing ACLU); Simmons, supra note 35, at 883 (discussing
NAACP, ACLU, and Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law); Birck, supra note
34, at 155 (discussing, among others, police unions and ACLU).
39. See, e.g., Pagliarella, supra note 34, at 535-36 (“Initial studies on the impact of
BWCs are tentatively encouraging.”).
40. Considering Cameras, supra note 34, at 1800 (“In [the Rialto] study, which ran from
February 2012 through July 2013, half of Rialto, California’s fifty-four patrol officers were
‘randomly assigned to wear the TASER AXON body-camera system.’ The results of the study
appeared conclusive: ‘[s]hifts without cameras experienced twice as many incidents of use of
force as shifts with cameras,’ and ‘the rate of use of force incidents per 1,000 contacts was
reduced by 2.5 times’ overall as compared to the previous twelve-month period.”) (footnote
omitted); Howard M. Wasserman, Recording of and by Police: The Good, the Bad, and the
Ugly, 20 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 543, 548 (2017) [hereinafter Wasserman, Recording of
and by Police] (“This study found that, when wearing cameras, officers were less likely to use
weapons and less likely to initiate physical contact with suspects, doing so only when
physically threatened. When not wearing cameras, officers were more likely to initiate
physical contact and more likely to use force, even when not physically threatened.”) (footnote
omitted); Mark Tunick, Regulating Public Access to Body Camera Footage: Response to
Iesha S. Nunes, “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot”, 67 FLA. L. REV. F. 143, 143-44, 144 n.10 (2016)
(“The authors found that there were fewer citizen complaints during the year (three, as
opposed to twenty-four in a prior year—although two of the three were lodged against officers
wearing cameras) and fewer use of force incidents (twenty-five versus fifty-four in a prior
year, seventeen of which involved ‘no-camera’ officers and eight of which involved ‘body
camera’ officers).”); Sommers, supra note 34, at 1311 (“Indeed, promising results from a pilot
program in Rialto, California found that body cameras were associated with a decrease in use
of force.”); Mary D. Fan, Democratizing Proof: Pooling Public and Police Body-Camera
Videos, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1639, 1656 (2018) [hereinafter Fan, Pooling Public and Police
Body-Camera Videos] (“The results indicated that officers not wearing body cameras used
force twice as often as officers wearing body cameras. However, the investigators were unable
to detect a statistically significant between-groups effect due to the low number of complaints
against either group.”) (footnote omitted); Chen, supra note 21, at 161 (noting Rialto study
results, including finding of “88% reduction in ‘citizen complaints’ ” ); Pagliarella, supra note
34, at 535-36 (discussing Rialto study results, including finding that officers who were
wearing cameras “cut their total use of force by 50%” and “were the objects of 88% fewer
complaints”).
41. Pagliarella, supra note 34, at 536 (“Subsequent studies in the United States and the
United Kingdom have also shown a drop in complaints and in use of force when BWCs are
in use.”); Wasserman, Recording of and by Police, supra note 40, at 548-50 (stating “[e]arly
studies of, and experiences with, cameras are hopeful” and discussing Rialto study, as well as
results in Mesa and Phoenix, Arizona and San Diego, California); Chen, supra note 21, at 161
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Whatever the specific causes, BWCs have quickly risen to
prominence.42 One commenter noted, “BWC technology has exploded
onto the law enforcement scene at an unbelievable pace.”43 Another
commenter has argued “a police body camera revolution is fast
unfolding.”44 Notwithstanding the increased interest in body cameras,
some have raised concerns about using such cameras, so discussing the
perceived concerns and benefits of body cameras may also be helpful.45
B. Body Camera Benefits and Concerns
Several benefits and concerns have been raised with the use of body
cameras. A few of the more common benefits and concerns that have
been advanced are treated here.46
1. Perceived Benefits of Body Cameras
The perceived benefits of body cameras include: (i) improving
behavior and decreasing misconduct; (ii) reducing or better resolving
citizen complaints; (iii) increasing accountability, legitimacy, and
transparency; (iv) collecting evidence; and (v) use in training. Each of
these will be discussed in turn.
First, improving behavior and decreasing misconduct have been
suggested as benefits of body cameras. In theory, when someone knows
they “ ‘ are being recorded and that the recording may be used as
(“The Mesa Police Department in Arizona found 75% fewer use of force complaints and 40%
fewer total complaints against officers wearing body cameras compared to those without.”).
Not all study findings could be considered encouraging, however. See, e.g., Fan, Pooling
Public and Police Body-Camera Videos, supra note 40, at 1657 (noting certain findings have
been “mixed” and “concerning”); Fausset & McDonnell Nieto del Rio, supra note 15
(“Research on the effects of body cameras so far have come to varied conclusions.”).
42. See, e.g., Gimbel, supra note 34, at 1583-84; Zamoff, supra note 21, at 5 (“[T]here
is growing consensus that outfitting police officers with body-worn cameras [] is one of the
reform measures most likely to have a positive impact on the situation.”); Sacharoff &
Lustbader, supra note 31, at 273, 281; Stoughton, supra note 31, at 1366 (“Body-worn
cameras are here, and more are coming.”); Fausset & McDonnell Nieto del Rio, supra note
15 (suggesting body cameras “have become more commonplace”).
43. Gimbel, supra note 34, at 1583 (“Among the policy vehicles for enhancing police
accountability, the use of [BWCs] by police officers has been one of the most widely
advocated, garnering the support of nearly 90% of Americans.”); see also Maury, supra note
31, at 486 (“Body camera implementation is a tidal wave that cannot be stopped.”).
44. See Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera Revolution, 50
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 901 (2017) [hereinafter Fan, Justice Visualized]; see also Stoughton,
supra note 31, at 1367 (“The popular belief in the inherent superiority of video footage has
led to what Mary Fan calls the ‘camera cultural revolution.’ The result, she predicts, is that
‘the future will be recorded.’ ” ) (footnote omitted).
45. See infra, Part II.B.
46. This Article does not attempt to itemize all such perceived benefits or concerns, nor
does it seek to evaluate the strength of them or weigh perceived concerns against perceived
benefits.
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evidence’ it will ‘deter misconduct and prompt police and the public to
behave better.’ ” 47 The presence of BWCs may have a “civilizing” effect
on citizen-law enforcement interactions.48 On the officer side, this might
mean, for instance, a reduction in use of force.49 On the citizen side,
civilians may be, for instance, more likely to comply with laws, act
respectfully, or obey officer directives.50
Second, reducing or better responding to citizen complaints has
been suggested as a benefit of body cameras.51 Having footage of events
47. Maury, supra note 31, at 488; see also Evans, supra note 22, at 77-81 (“[T]he Rialto
study suggests that when officers are being filmed and are aware that they will be held
accountable for their actions, they are more inclined to resist using force until absolutely
necessary.”); Letourneau, supra note 21, at 446; Simmons, supra note 35, at 885-86; Howard
M. Wasserman, Moral Panics and Body Cameras, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 831, 837 (2015)
[hereinafter Wasserman, Moral Panics] (noting supporters offer benefits, including deterring
misconduct and prompting police to behave better).
48. Maury, supra note 31, at 488; see also Considering Cameras, supra note 34, at 1800;
WHITE, supra note 25, at 20 (“Advocates of body-worn cameras have argued the technology
will change police officer behavior during encounters with citizens.”); Evans, supra note 22,
at 82 (“While the Rialto study suggests that body cameras can be used to deter officer
misconduct, the decrease in use-of-force incidents may also be explained by an improvement
in civilian behavior when they are aware that they are being filmed.”); Stoughton, supra note
31, at 1383 (“With regard to decreasing incivility, it is hoped that officers and civilians who
are being recorded will be more polite to each other, improving the character of police
encounters.”).
49. See Evans, supra note 22, at 77-78 (“Body cameras can potentially reduce the amount
of force an officer uses when engaging with a civilian in tense situations.”); Stoughton, supra
note 31, at 1383 (“[W]ith regard to reducing violence, the objective is to discourage resistance
by civilians and gratuitously severe or frequent uses of force by officers, especially in the
context of deadly force.”); Kampfe, supra note 34, at 1162 (“[I]nstances of police use-of-force
have been shown to decrease by as much as 58% by employing [police worn body cameras].”);
Mary Anne Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 475 (2017)
(“Some studies have suggested that the use of body cameras greatly reduces the use of force
in police encounters . . . .”).
50. See Stoughton, supra note 31, at 1384 (“There is some reason to believe that bodyworn cameras do influence civilian and officer behavior, although the results of empirical
studies are not consistent.”); Kampfe, supra note 34, at 1164 (“Furthermore, as the public’s
opinion of police becomes more positive, citizens become more compliant and crime rates
decrease.”); Letourneau, supra note 21, at 448 (“Proponents suggest that officers wearing
body cameras will improve the behavior of the citizens with whom they interact . . . .”); Evans,
supra note 22, at 82 (“In addition to more desirable officer behavior, studies also found that
body cameras improved citizen behavior.”); Maury, supra note 31, at 488-89; Gonzales &
Cochran, supra note 33, at 309-10; Simmons, supra note 35, at 886; Wasserman, Moral
Panics, supra note 47, at 837; WHITE, supra note 25, at 22-23 (“Proponents of body-worn
cameras have also argued that the technology will improve citizen behavior during encounters
with police, suggesting that they will be more respectful and compliant.”).
51. Considering Cameras, supra note 34, at 1801-02; Evans, supra note 22, at 79-80
(referencing studies in Phoenix, Arizona and Plymouth, England); Gonzales & Cochran,
supra note 33, at 308-10; Kampfe, supra note 34, at 1165 (“Departments that have adopted
the use of PWBCs [police-worn body cameras] have seen a significant drop in the number of
complaints filed and sustained against officers.”); Simmons, supra note 35, at 886; Franks,
supra note 49, at 475 (“Some studies have suggested that the use of body cameras greatly
reduces . . . the number of complaints lodged against police.”); Wasserman, Moral Panics,
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may, in theory, lower the overall number of actual complaints and
discourage the filing of untruthful complaints.52 Similarly, advocates
contend that BWCs “can produce records of events that could expedite
the resolution of complaints and lawsuits against officers.”53
Third, it has been suggested that BWCs could increase
accountability, legitimacy, and transparency.54 It may be that, in “the
event of officer misconduct, body cameras can be used to hold officers
accountable for their inappropriate actions.”55 The capability to
“accurately and more frequently place responsibility on an officer when
it is due should [also] directly translate into increased departmental
transparency.”56 Further, it may be that BWCs help restore faith in the
police and promote a sense of procedural fairness and perceived
legitimacy in officer-citizen encounters.57

supra note 47, at 837 (noting supporters insist that “there will be fewer citizen
complaints. . . .”); WHITE, supra note 25, at 23-24.
52. WHITE, supra note 25, at 23-24; Considering Cameras, supra note 34, at 1801-02;
Kampfe, supra note 34, at 1165; Maury, supra note 31, at 488 (“The results, advocates claim,
are a reduction in both use-of-force by police, and complaints filed against officers.”).
53. See Letourneau, supra note 21, at 449-50; see also WHITE, supra note 25, at 23-24.
54. Considering Cameras, supra note 34, at 1803; Lawrence, supra note 21, at 616;
Evans, supra note 22, at 81-82; Letourneau, supra note 21, at 445-46; Gonzales & Cochran,
supra note 33, at 310-11; Maury, supra note 31, at 491-93; Stoughton, supra note 31, at
1381-82 (discussing accountability, transparency, and public trust); Kampfe, supra note 34,
at 1163 (“As the demand for PWBCs [police-worn body cameras] increases in response to
public distrust of police officers, the most important benefit of PWBCs to the public is the
accountability and transparency they can provide.”); Simmons, supra note 35, at 887
(discussing accountability and transparency); Fan, Pooling Public and Police Body-Camera
Videos, supra note 40, at 1664 (“While the primary reasons for adopting police-worn body
cameras differ depending on perspective, a widespread rationale, particularly embraced by
civil rights and community groups, is rebuilding public trust through improved
transparency.”); WHITE, supra note 25, at 19-20.
55. See Evans, supra note 22, at 81-82 (“[B]ody cameras create a platform to monitor
job performance and ultimately hold officers accountable for inappropriate behavior.”); see
also Maury, supra note 31, at 492-93 (“When the public is able to access and observe police
misconduct, it possesses the power to use legal institutions to hold such misconduct
accountable (and in a more efficient manner too).”); Lawrence, supra note 21, at 616
(mentioning officer “accountability” as a “driving factor[]”); Stoughton, supra note 31, at
1394 (“[A]dditional video could potentially help recalibrate the current flawed approach to
officer accountability by providing much-needed information.”).
56. See Letourneau, supra note 21, at 450; see also WHITE, supra note 25, at 19-20
(“Transparency, or willingness by a police department to open itself up to outside scrutiny, is
an important perceived benefit of officer body-worn cameras.”); Maury, supra note 31, at
491-93 (discussing transparency); Fan, Pooling Public and Police Body-Camera Videos,
supra note 40, at 1664-65 (same).
57. Gonzales & Cochran, supra note 33, at 310-11 (discussing legitimacy); Kampfe,
supra note 34, at 1164 (same); Maury, supra note 31, at 491-93 (noting restoring confidence
and faith in law enforcement as potentially the “greatest benefit” of BWCs).
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Fourth, proponents have suggested that body cameras can be
helpful in evidence collection.58 In theory, having a video record of
encounters between police and citizens could assist in factual
determinations during trial and resolution of disputes prior to trial.59 For
instance, BWC footage could be used to verify written statements or
reports.60 It could also help defense attorneys and prosecutors by
providing “objective evidence” concerning “whether a confession was
voluntary” or a search “consented to or justified.”61
Fifth, and finally, the usefulness of body cameras in training police
officers has been cited as a benefit.62 Modern police training purportedly
“involves a substantial number of videos.”63 Videos may “offer[] a rare
window into which would-be officers can see what the world is really
like.”64 The footage could also be used to train police officers for

58. Considering Cameras, supra note 34, at 1803; Maury, supra note 31, at 490;
Stoughton, supra note 31, at 1393 (discussing potential to produce objective and accurate
evidence); Kampfe, supra note 34, at 1182-83 (noting role of footage in trial); Johnathan M.
Nixon, Comment, Eye Spy Injustice: Delving into the Implications Police Body Cameras Will
Have on Police Officers and Citizens, 60 HOW. L.J. 719, 738-39 (2017); Wasserman, Moral
Panics, supra note 47, at 837; WHITE, supra note 25, at 24-25 (noting potential to facilitate
arrest and prosecution).
59. Maury, supra note 31, at 489-90 (noting record of events could lead to guilty pleas
instead of trial).
60. See Considering Cameras, supra note 34, at 1803; see also Stoughton, supra note
31, at 1394 (discussing use in supporting investigations or prosecutions).
61. Considering Cameras, supra note 34, at 1803; Letourneau, supra note 21, at 456-57
(“Many proponents of police body cameras suggest that video evidence from these devices
‘will facilitate the arrest and prosecution of offenders.’ . . . Recorded evidence also has the
potential to positively assist defendants in court.”) (footnote omitted).
62. Stoughton, supra note 31, at 1397-98, 1421 (noting BWCs promise to “facilitate
officer training”); Chen, supra note 21, at 163 (noting value in developing better training
programs); Considering Cameras, supra note 34, at 1802; Lawrence, supra note 21, at 618
(“Using one officer’s experience to educate others allows for second-hand learning.”);
Simmons, supra note 35, at 887 (“Even if officers display behaviors that are not actionable or
subject to disciplinary proceedings, supervisors can use the footage to determine which
officers may be in need of additional training, or whether the entire department might benefit
from particular training.”); WHITE, supra note 25, at 25-26. In particular, “review of bodycamera footage may be [] useful in monitoring new officers.” Considering Cameras, supra
note 34, at 1802; Nixon, supra note 58, at 739 (“Police officers can use footage captured by
body cameras to educate and train young and newly-admitted officers.”).
63. See Stoughton, supra note 31, at 1397-98; see also Nixon, supra note 58, at 739
(“These videos can be used as scenario-based training tools, determining areas where officers
perform strongly and areas where they may need more work before being placed in the
field.”). Privacy may be recognized as valuable for a number of reasons. See, e.g., Daniel J.
Solove, The Myth of the Privacy Paradox, 89 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 37-41 (2021) (discussing
why privacy is valuable and noting, for example, its value in maintaining appropriate social
boundaries, limiting power of companies and the government, and reputation management).
64. Stoughton, supra note 31, at 1397 (“One common theme can be found in ‘officer
survival’ videos, which attempt to remind officers of the dangers of complacency by showing
officers being brutally attacked, disarmed, or killed. Indeed, it is the rare officer who has not
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high-risk situations (including armed encounters or active shooters) and
to debrief police officers after critical incidents.65 In this way, officers
“can learn from the experiences and mistakes of the other officers” rather
than having “to make costly mistakes themselves.”66
Although these benefits have been discussed in connection with
body cameras, certain concerns have also been raised. This Article next
considers such concerns.
2. Perceived Concerns with Body Cameras
The perceived concerns with body cameras include: (i) privacy; (ii)
fairness; and (iii) costs. Each of these concerns will be discussed in turn.
First, privacy concerns have been raised with body cameras.67
Placing body cameras on all officers in the United States may be seen as
a “serious threat” to privacy.68 Important privacy questions have been
raised in areas such as “the consent of the civilians being recorded, who
can access the footage, how the footage will be stored, and how the
footage will be used.”69 For instance, the footage could be released for
seen the video-recorded line-of-duty deaths of Laurens County, Georgia Deputy Kyle
Dinkheller or South Carolina Trooper Mark Coates.”) (footnotes omitted).
65. See id. at 1397-98; see also Considering Cameras, supra note 34, at 1802 (noting
potential use in “remedial training”); WHITE, supra note 25, at 25-26 (noting potential use for
“critical incidents,” including use of force).
66. Lawrence, supra note 21, at 618.
67. Simmons, supra note 35, at 889 (“The privacy concerns present complicated
issues.”); Considering Cameras, supra note 34, at 1808 (“Privacy is a counterpoint to access:
increasing transparency necessarily means more people will view body-camera footage,
which will frequently feature civilians who may not want the recordings of themselves
shared.”); Franks, supra note 49, at 476 (“[T]here is yet another reason to hesitate, which has
to do with the privacy and surveillance implications of mandatory police body cameras.”);
Letourneau, supra note 21, at 453 (“[B]ody cameras coupled with other technology, such as
facial recognition software, have the possibility to deepen the mire of privacy issues.”); Evans,
supra note 22, at 83; Maury, supra note 31, at 492-93; Gonzales & Cochran, supra note 33,
at 314, 326; Kampfe, supra note 34, at 1169-75; Fan, Pooling Public and Police Body-Camera
Videos, supra note 40, at 1665 (“Privacy protection also looms as a major challenge.”); Nixon,
supra note 58, at 732-33; WHITE, supra note 25, at 27-28. At the same time, it has also been
suggested that BWCs may actually offer some privacy-related benefits. See Thomas, supra
note 34, at 199-201 (listing certain perceived privacy benefits of police body cameras, such
as their potential to “help reduce illegal searches” or reduce “the prevalence of privacyinfringing crime, such as burglary and stalking.”).
68. Woodrow Hartzog, Body Cameras and the Path to Redeem Privacy Law, 96 N.C. L.
REV. 1257, 1258 (2018); Simmons, supra note 35, at 889 (noting “fiercest opposition” has
come from groups which are concerned about privacy implications).
69. See Franks, supra note 49, at 477; see also Thomas, supra note 34, at 197 (“Body
camera usage affects the privacy interests of many more people than the direct subjects of
investigation, however. Bystanders or passersby, whether involved with the subject of an
encounter or not, will inevitably be captured on a large number of recordings in both public
and private settings, perhaps unaware that the police are filming.”) (footnote omitted); Fan,
Pooling Public and Police Body-Camera Videos, supra note 40, at 1665; Nixon, supra note
58, at 733 (“The accidental and incidental filming of individuals could raise concerns that,
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no reason aside from embarrassing an individual, such as the release of
video depicting “celebrity DUI stops or other similar situations.”70
Similarly, the long-term storage of “intimate interactions”—such as
domestic disputes—may raise privacy concerns.71
The Fourth
Amendment implications of recording may be a particular concern for
citizens,72 and police officers may also be concerned about their own
privacy at work.73 More broadly, critics may view BWCs as a means of
enhanced government surveillance.74
Second, critics have raised fairness concerns with body cameras.75
There is a worry that juries will be overly reliant on BWC video or will
reach improper conclusions based on it.76 Overreliance on BWC video
could be especially concerning since it has been suggested that camera
video can potentially mislead, or biases may impact viewers.77 For
although [a] body camera[] provide[s] an account of an officer’s actions, it vicariously surveys
those individuals who happen to fall within the range of the camera’s view.”).
70. Evans, supra note 22, at 83. It may be that the more access which is afforded the
media, the subjects of the video, and the public, the greater the opportunity for privacy
intrusions. See Maury, supra note 31, at 493.
71. See Considering Cameras, supra note 34, at 1808; see also Evans, supra note 22, at
83.
72. Nixon, supra note 58, at 732; Erik Nielsen, Comment, Fourth Amendment
Implications of Police-Worn Body Cameras, 48 ST. MARY’S L.J. 115, 120 (noting concerns
with individual right “to be free from unreasonable searches”); Chen, supra note 21, at 164.
73. Nixon, supra note 58, at 733; WHITE, supra note 25, at 28-29.
74. Hartzog, supra note 68, at 1312 (“If lawmakers keep applying the same privacy
frameworks to the rules for body cameras, they will get what they’ve always gotten: an
inconsistent set of rules that do not seem to match people’s actual expectations of privacy and
actually seem to facilitate the slow creep toward more surveillance.”); Considering Cameras,
supra note 34, at 1810 (discussing “government surveillance”); Franks, supra note 49, at 476
(describing BWCs as a “powerful form of surveillance”).
75. See, e.g., Sacharoff & Lustbader, supra note 31, at 276; Letourneau, supra note 21,
at 460-63; Maury, supra note 31, at 491; Gonzales & Cochran, supra note 33, at 319; Daniel
Bernard Trimble, Body-Worn Cameras: The Implementation of Both the Police Department’s
Rollout of Cameras and the State’s Attorney’s Office’s Processing of Data for Discovery, 47
U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 381-82 (2018); Franks, supra note 49, at 475.
76. Letourneau, supra note 21, at 460-63; Maury, supra note 31, at 491 (“[O]verreliance
is worrisome.”).
77. See Considering Cameras, supra note 34, at 1812-14 (discussing implicit bias in
perceiving the story depicted and “unconscious incorporation of implicit biases when
determining whether an officer’s actions were ‘reasonable’ under the circumstances . . . .”);
Fan, Pooling Public and Police Body-Camera Videos, supra note 40, at 1662 (“A camera’s
position and angle, the perspective from which recordings are made, and the time-framing of
what is recorded all may powerfully shape a story and potentially mislead.”); Lawrence, supra
note 21, at 624-25; Stoughton, supra note 31, at 1413 (“These biases may be even more
troubling given our propensity to be highly confident in our own conclusions, a tendency that
may be artificially bolstered even further when our conclusions are based on our review of
video evidence.”); Birck, supra note 34, at 173 (“Body-camera footage, while helpful
evidence, will be informed by and viewed through a lens of implicit bias.”); Nixon, supra note
58, at 732 (“Body cameras, as their name infers, are worn on the body of a police officer. As
a result, a legitimate concern has been raised about whether these cameras display an accurate
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instance, a camera “may not be at the right angle to catch the flash of a
suspect’s weapon or the stomps of officers beating a suspect” while a
viewer’s “prior ideological commitments [could] influence their
interpretation of a recording.”78 That it is law enforcement that retains
control of video could raise concerns that body cameras may
“exacerbate[] the unfairness already deeply entrenched in the criminal
justice system.”79
Third, and finally, the cost of body camera use has been cited as a
concern.80 Relevant costs may include initial program implementation
record of an encounter.”); Wasserman, Moral Panics, supra note 47, at 840 (“More
problematic is the insistence that body cameras will provide video evidence that is always an
objective, neutral, certain, and unambiguous representation of what happened in an encounter,
leaving no doubts and no he-said/he-said disputes.”); Zamoff, supra note 21, at 18-19
(“Another concern is that bodycam evidence will be so emotionally compelling that it will
render ‘factfinders vulnerable to a host of biases, including naïve realism, or the belief that
what one sees is the uncontroverted truth; the inability to recognize the role of subjectivity;
the fragmentation of perspective; and identification bias.’ ” ).
78. Fan, Pooling Public and Police Body-Camera Videos, supra note 40, at 1662-63.
79. Sacharoff & Lustbader, supra note 31, at 274. Officers might, for instance, seek to
manipulate, or restrict access to, body camera video. See, e.g., Sacharoff & Lustbader, supra
note 31, at 274-76; Considering Cameras, supra note 34, at 1806; Franks, supra note 49, at
475; Fan, Pooling Public and Police Body-Camera Videos, supra note 40, at 1665
(“Nondisclosure or delayed disclosure of body-camera footage has led to anger and outrage
among some community groups.”); Nixon, supra note 58, at 734-35 (“In step with the concern
that body cameras may violate individuals’ privacy rights is the concern of that police
department or authoritative figures who may have something to lose, will use their influence
or access to body cameras to edit, or simply not record, body camera footage for their own
personal agenda. . . . [N]ot all law enforcement officers or police departments are forthright
with their reports or camera footage.”) (footnote omitted).
80. Letourneau, supra note 21, at 451-52 (“Implementing police body cameras is an
expensive proposition, even at the department level—these devices can reach up to $1000 per
camera unit. Allocations for replacement hardware also must be considered. Further, the
largest cost of camera implementation and use does not lie in the equipment itself but in the
storage, management, and retention of data.”) (footnotes omitted); Lawrence, supra note 21,
at 618; Gonzales & Cochran, supra note 33, at 318; Nixon, supra note 58, at 730-31 (“There
are more than 1,000,000 law enforcement personnel in the United States today, and to equip
each one of these individuals—or even a majority of them—with a body camera could become
extremely expensive especially considering the cost of purchasing the equipment and training
officers to effectively use said cameras.”); Zamoff, supra note 21, at 12 (“In fact, there are
substantial barriers to entry that have prevented several major urban police departments from
equipping all their officers with bodycams and that have kept many other police forces from
adopting any bodycam program at all. These barriers include not only the cost of the
equipment but the cost of storing vast quantities of bodycam data . . . .”); WHITE, supra note
25, at 32-34. Of course, it has also been suggested that BWCs may save money, such as by
decreasing the number of civil suits against officers or reducing administrative time
investigating officer shootings. See Gonzales & Cochran, supra note 33, at 319 (“Although
such savings may be difficult to quantify, supporters counter they are nevertheless real and
should not be ignored.”); Considering Cameras, supra note 34, at 1809 (noting certain “costs
may be offset by savings on litigation, if cameras do in fact lead to fewer complaints and more
efficient resolution of police misconduct cases”); Lawrence, supra note 21, at 620;
Letourneau, supra note 21, at 456; Evans, supra note 22, at 80-81 (“While body cameras are
expensive, the Rialto study projected that the police department saved $4 in litigation costs
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costs and continuing costs, such as for data manipulation, data storage,
and preparation of footage for use.81 The full costs can be substantial,
and some departments have opted to discontinue their body camera
programs in the wake of such costs.82
Before moving on from the perceived concerns (and benefits) of
body cameras, it is worth noting the importance some commenters have
placed upon substantive body camera policies and procedures. As one
commenter stated: “[i]t is not enough to demand body cameras and
video; we must decide and establish rules governing all aspects of how
cameras and the resulting video will be used.”83 As another commenter
stated:
There are . . . a massive range of policy considerations that are best
addressed through consultation with stakeholders, including officers

for every $1 spent on the cameras.”); Nixon, supra note 58, at 738 (“For complaints that were
found to have merit, police departments may have to conduct lengthy and costly investigations
to determine whether the officer was within the scope of his employment or whether a
punishment should be handed down. Potentially, this could all be avoided by the
implementation of body cameras.”) (footnote omitted); Zamoff, supra note 21, at 17.
81. Letourneau, supra note 21, at 451-52 (“But the initial cost of the physical devices is
not the source of the largest budget constraints the cameras will ultimately cause. The longterm usage of police body cameras will require substantial continued expenditure—especially
in data storage, data manipulation, and the production of a courtroom-ready product.”); Evans,
supra note 22, at 90-91; Considering Cameras, supra note 34, at 1809 (“While the start-up
cost of outfitting a force with body cameras is not trivial for cash-strapped departments, the
costs of storing and transmitting this data can be particularly staggering: some departments
have already spent hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars managing their data.”);
Lawrence, supra note 21, at 618-19; Gonzales & Cochran, supra note 33, at 318-19
(discussing costs beyond cameras themselves, including training, other equipment, storage,
management, and legal costs); Kampfe, supra note 34, at 1179 (“The cost of reviewing
footage for the purposes of redaction and classification also poses a tremendous burden on
police departments.”); Zamoff, supra note 21, at 14 (discussing data storage costs); WHITE,
supra note 25, at 32-34 (discussing data storage and management).
82. Letourneau, supra note 21, at 451-52; Kimberly Kindy, Some U.S. police
departments dump body-camera programs amid high costs, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/some-us-police-departments-dump-body-cameraprograms-amid-high-costs/2019/01/21/991f0e66-03ad-11e9-b6a9-0aa5c2fcc9e4_story.html
(“[A]lthough the cameras were widely adopted, many departments—especially in smaller
jurisdictions—are now dropping or delaying their programs, finding it too expensive to store
and manage the thousands of hours of footage.”).
83. Wasserman, Recording of and by Police, supra note 40, at 555 (“The 2015
DOJ/PERF study offered thirty-three recommendations, with the key being that every
department establish clear, specific, and detailed guidelines for all elements of camera and
video usage.”); see also Simmons, supra note 35, at 883 (“Even many of the agencies that are
using the cameras are racing to develop sound policies for their use.”); Mary D. Fan, Missing
Police Body Camera Videos: Remedies, Evidentiary Fairness, and Automatic Activation, 52
GA. L. REV. 57, 62 (2017) (analyzing “available major-city body camera policies” and finding
“widespread enforcement gaps in body camera policies.”); Mary D. Fan, Body Cameras, Big
Data, and Police Accountability, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1236, 1244 (2018) (analyzing
police department body camera policies to draw conclusions); Maury, supra note 31, at 487.
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themselves, interest groups such as the prosecution and defense bar,
and individual community members. Policies relating to officer and
civilian privacy, notification that an officer is recording and that
civilians have (or do not have) the right to request the officer to not
record in different situations, the transmission and storage of digital
video, retention periods, automated analysis, provision of video to
private technology companies for machine-learning purposes, et
cetera, can all affect the ultimate results of an agency’s BWC
program.84

Adoption of body camera policies and procedures may, thus, be
seen as one means of seeking to mitigate certain concerns regarding body
cameras while increasing the likelihood of realizing the benefits of such
cameras.85 The next Part will set out the methodology utilized in this
Article.
III. METHODOLOGY
This Article creates the Police Body Camera Infrastructure Index
(“BCII”), which seeks to measure inadequacy in body camera
infrastructure among local law enforcement agencies in the United
States. This Part sets out the data and methodology used in creating and
calculating the BCII.
A. Data
The BCII draws upon the results of the 2016 Law Enforcement
Management and Administrative Statistics Body-Worn Camera
Supplement study (“LEMAS Study”), which the Bureau of Justice
Statistics in the U.S. Department of Justice authored and the

84. Stoughton, supra note 31, at 1414; see also Fan, Public Disclosure, supra note 21, at
401-02 (“These policies are often enacted with some community input, whether through
community meetings, online surveys, or both. The balances struck in body camera policies
are important to investigate because they are governing how body cameras are being deployed
on the ground. Legislatures and the courts often trail behind technology, leaving law
enforcement to establish the baseline rules that courts and legislatures codify, approve, or
amend in some respects. To understand the future balance between public disclosure and
privacy, it is important to look beyond the few formal laws on the books to the many more
departmental policies guiding practices on the ground.”) (footnotes omitted).
85. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 34, at 194 (“Privacy and accountability are the primary
interests implicated with body camera use, and policies must adequately protect both interests
for implementation to actually benefit the public.”); Maury, supra note 31, at 487 (“[T]he
most important question is, how should body camera policies be designed to achieve positive
results?”); Fan, Public Disclosure, supra note 21, at 401-02 (“As debates continue, balances
between transparency and privacy protection are already being struck on the ground in body
camera policies issued by police departments deploying body cameras.”). Of course, the actual
policy choices are important. See, e.g., Stoughton, supra note 31, at 1414; Maury, supra note
31, at 487; Kampfe, supra note 34, at 1187-1200 (including sample policy).
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Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research
produced.86 The LEMAS Study sample was derived from a law
enforcement database containing 15,810 general purpose agencies,
which included 12,695 county and local police departments, 49 primary
state police departments, and 3,066 sheriffs’ offices.87 The final size of
the sample was 4,976 agencies.88 Data collection was largely conducted
via the web or a mail-in survey, with additional data captured via
telephone interviews.89 Ultimately, 3,928 total agencies completed the
study’s survey, for a 79% response rate.90 Of those, 1,915 agencies
reported having acquired body cameras by the survey date.91 Since the
positions of the three different types of agencies—county/local, state,
and sheriffs’ offices—may be distinct and since this Article is most
interested in the position of the more local agencies, this Article focuses
solely on data from the 1,460 county and local police departments who

86. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, LAW ENFORCEMENT MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE STATISTICS BODYWORN CAMERA SUPPLEMENT (LEMAS-BWCS) 2016, at 1, 4-5 (2016) [hereinafter LEMAS
STUDY]. See Coleman, supra note 16, at 1375-76 (using same data source and noting “[i]n the
summary data description, the time period is reflected as 2015-2016”). It should be noted that,
although this Article cites to pages in the LEMAS Study’s codebook, the data is largely drawn
from the LEMAS Study’s Stata dataset. See Coleman, supra note 16, at 1375 n.76.
87. LEMAS STUDY, supra note 86, at 5 (“Local police departments and sheriffs’ offices
were chosen for the [LEMAS Study] using a stratified sample design based on number of fulland part-time sworn officers (part-time officers were counted as 0.5 full-time equivalents) and
agency type. The sample was designed to be representative of all general purpose state and
local law enforcement agencies in the United States, with separate samples drawn of local
police departments and sheriffs’ offices. All 49 primary state law enforcement agencies (state
police and highway patrol) and all local departments and sheriffs’ offices with 100 or more
full-time sworn officers were included. Agencies serving special jurisdictions (such as
schools, airports, or parks), or with special enforcement responsibilities (such as conservation
laws or alcohol laws), were considered out of scope for the [LEMAS Study].”)
88. Id.
89. Id. (“Among the responding agencies, 86% completed via web, 12% via mail, and
2% by combination of web and phone.”).
90. See id. at 6 (“Since the overall response rate was less than 80%, a non-response bias
analysis was conducted.”); see also Coleman, supra note 16, at 1375-76 n.78 (“The base
weights are set out in the [LEMAS STUDY] codebook.”). Base weights and information on
sampling error estimates are reflected in the codebook. See LEMAS STUDY, supra note 86,
at 6 (“Variance and standard error estimates . . . were generated . . . [and] [t]he Taylor
linearization method for a ‘stratified without replacement’ design was used for these
calculations.”); For more information on the LEMAS Study sample, limitations, and design,
see generally LEMAS STUDY, supra note 86.
91. Data from question 10a in the LEMAS Study was used to derive this number. See
LEMAS STUDY, supra note 86, at 16; see also Coleman, supra note 16, at 1376 n.81.
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reported body camera acquisition.92 The county and local police
departments studied will be referred to as the “Local Agencies.”93
B. Alkire-Foster Adjusted Headcount Ratio
The BCII adopts the functional form of Sabina Alkire and James
Foster’s Adjusted Headcount Ratio (M0), a discrete multidimensional
measure within a larger family of measures initially developed to study
poverty.94 The M0 allows for the identification of inadequate units
through the analysis of unit insufficiency across a number of selected
indicators.95 It has been called a “high-resolution lens” and is
particularly suited to informing policy because it produces an overall
measure, may be decomposed for targeting particular subgroups, permits
identification of inadequacy drivers, and is suited to both ordinal and
cardinal data.96 The M0 may be preferable to dashboards and composite
indices—other multidimensional measurement techniques, which have
more commonly been featured in legal scholarship—since these other
techniques “focus on each factor individually, and so fail to reveal how
different factors are interdependent.”97 The M0, for instance, permits the
92. LEMAS STUDY, supra note 86, at 16; Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 262 (“We
suspect that, given the different nature of the three types of agencies, their capacities should
be evaluated with reference to different criteria. Thus, for purposes of our measure, we
focused exclusively on the local police departments . . . .”).
93. Missing values and observations which are not helpful for the BCII’s focus—such as
“Don’t know” or “Unsure/don’t know”—are generally excluded in constructing the BCII and
reporting its findings. See generally LEMAS STUDY, supra note 86. Accordingly, the actual
number of observations for the BCII—and number of agencies studied—is 1,115 rather than
1,460.
94. See generally Sabina Alkire & James Foster, Counting and Multidimensional
Poverty Measurement, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 476 (2011); SABINA ALKIRE ET AL.,
MULTIDIMENSIONAL POVERTY MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS (2015); Sabina Alkire, José
Manuel Roche & Ana Vaz, Changes over Time in Multidimensional Poverty: Methodology
and Results for 34 Countries, 94 WORLD DEV. 232 (2017); see also Coleman & Vaz, supra
note 20, at 255-56 (noting Alkire and Foster’s multidimensional measurement “framework
helps reveal the extent to which units under study fall below an established standard, i.e., the
extent to which units (perhaps individuals or institutions) are inadequate according to some
selected criteria.”). This Article will utilize the terminology “insufficient” and “inadequate”—
rather than “deprived” and “poor” (e.g., the terminology that would normally be utilized in
the poverty literature)—because this Article focuses on application of the measure in the law
enforcement, rather than in the poverty, context. See Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 255
n.17 (noting use of such terminology when discussing “measurement’s capacity outside the
poverty context”).
95. See Alkire, Roche & Vaz supra note 94, at 233; Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at
255-56. A unit is considered “insufficient” when it does not meet the sufficiency threshold
established by the researcher for a given indicator and “inadequate” when the unit does not
meet the overall threshold set by the researcher for adequacy.
96. ALKIRE ET AL., supra note 94, at 21; Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 254-56.
97. ALKIRE ET AL., supra note 94, at 72-75 (discussing dashboards and composite
indices); Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 253-54 (noting these other techniques are still
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identification of units that experience insufficiency in a larger share of
indicators simultaneously.
Construction of an M0 measure may be seen as a series of five
steps.98 First, the measure’s purpose must be defined.99 Second, the unit
of identification must be established.100 The unit of identification will
be the entity under study, which the measure will identify as either
adequate or inadequate.101 Third, statistical indicators must be selected
and assigned weights.102 Indicators may be based on specific variables
in a dataset, and weights are assigned to such indicators based on their
comparative importance to the measure.103 For convenience, similar
indicators may be grouped into dimensions.104 Fourth, insufficiency
cutoffs must be established for specific indicators, along with an overall
inadequacy cutoff for individual units.105 The selected cutoffs should
reflect the minimum attainment necessary to not be considered
insufficient in an indicator or inadequate overall.106 Fifth, and finally,
“extremely useful”). Dashboards measure each factor independently without aggregation,
and, although composite indices do offer aggregation, they aggregate independent factors into
a single number. See Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 253-54. The M0 approach may also
be preferable to other approaches such as statistical approaches and Venn diagrams, since the
M0 produces a summary measure (unlike a Venn diagram) and it also allows “easier
comparison across metrics based on different data sets” (unlike statistical approaches).
Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 254 n.4; see also ALKIRE ET AL., supra note 94, at 70-122.
98. Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 256 (noting “there are not necessarily defined
‘steps’ for creating a measure,” but presenting creation of measure as consisting of steps for
convenience).
99. Id. at 256. This requires determining “why the measure is being created.” Id. at 259.
100. Id. at 256.
101. Id. at 256-57 (noting that “the measure’s purpose” should “guide the choice of
appropriate unit of identification”).
102. Id. at 257 (“An indicator may be defined as ‘a data element that represents statistical
data for a specified time, place, and other characteristics.’ ” ).
103. Id. Put another way, “the weight assigned to an indicator reflects the value that an
insufficiency in such indicator has for inadequacy, relative to insufficiencies in other
indicators.” ALKIRE ET AL., supra note 94, at 197.
104. Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 257 (“Dimensions may be defined as ‘conceptual
categories into which indicators may be arranged (and possibly weighted) for intuition and
ease of communication.’ Grouping related indicators into dimensions may aid communication
of the measure’s results, since there would normally be fewer dimensions than there are
indicators, and the thematic dimensions may be more accessible to those less connected to the
research.”) (citation omitted); ALKIRE ET AL., supra note 94, at 197, 202.
105. Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 257 (noting it may be helpful to select an
inadequacy cutoff such that the measure “identif[ies] as inadequate only those units with
enough insufficiencies as might compromise a unit’s performance”).
106. Id. (“The insufficiency cutoff for an indicator reflects the minimum attainment
required so as not to be insufficient in such indicator. The inadequacy cutoff reflects what
minimum share of weighted insufficiencies would be necessary to identify a unit as
inadequate.”) (footnote omitted); ALKIRE ET AL., supra note 94, at 197. There are several
approaches for selecting cutoffs. See Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 257-58 n.33 (“For
instance, one could deem a unit inadequate if such unit were insufficient in at least one
indicator (called the union approach). This approach would generally identify a large group
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the M0 must be calculated.107 This fifth step requires identification of
inadequate units,108 and then calculation of: (1) the incidence of
inadequacy (proportion of inadequate units, also called the headcount
ratio);109 (2) intensity of inadequacy (average share of insufficiencies
among the inadequate units, also called breath of inadequacy);110 and (3)
Adjusted Headcount Ratio or M0 (a measure of overall
inadequacy—considering “incidence” and “intensity”).111 The Adjusted
Headcount Ratio corresponds to the insufficiencies that are “experienced
by inadequate units expressed as a proportion of all possible
insufficiencies (if all units were insufficient in all indicators).”112 In
being sensitive to both the intensity and incidence of inadequacy, the
of units as inadequate, potentially including some which are only insufficient in a single
indicator and whose performance may not be impaired by such insufficiency. An alternative
option might be to deem a unit inadequate only if it were insufficient in all indicators (called
the intersection approach). This approach generally identifies as inadequate a very small group
of units, perhaps leaving out units with many insufficiencies whose performance might be
hindered even though they are not insufficient in all indicators. Where appropriate, it is helpful
to select an inadequacy cutoff between these two extremes, potentially permitting one to
identify as inadequate only those units with enough insufficiencies as might compromise a
unit’s performance.”) (citations omitted).
107. Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 258. The Adjusted Headcount Ratio (M0) may also
be called the multidimensional index. See id.
108. Id. (“Suppose you have a population of n units and information on their attainments
in d indicators. Let xij represent the attainment of unit i on indicator j. Assume wj stands for
the relative weight of indicator j, and the weights of the d indicators sum to one: ∑ 𝑤 = 1.
Then, let zj reflect the insufficiency cutoff for indicator j, and k denote the overall inadequacy
cutoff. Unit i is identified as insufficient in indicator j if its attainment on that indicator is
below the respective insufficiency cutoff: gij = 1 if xij < zj and gij = 0 if xij ≥ zj. The inadequacy
score of unit i, denoted ci, is the weighted sum of its insufficiencies: ci = ∑ 𝑤 𝑔 . Unit i is
identified as inadequate if its inadequacy score is equal to or greater than the inadequacy
cutoff: ci ≥ k.”) (footnote omitted); Alkire & Foster, supra note 94, at 477-80.
109. Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 258 (“The incidence of inadequacy . . . , denoted
by H, is the proportion of inadequate units: H = , where q is the number of inadequate units.”);
Alkire & Foster, supra note 94, at 477-80; see also Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 255-59
(“By ‘incidence of inadequacy,’ we mean the percentage of analyzed units that are
inadequate.”); OXFORD POVERTY & HUMAN DEV. INITIATIVE, CONSTRUCTING A
MULTIDIMENSIONAL
POVERTY
MEASURE
(2015),
http://www.ophi.org.uk/wpcontent/uploads/Constructing-a-multidimensional-poverty-index-WEB-Jan-2015.pdf.
110. Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 258 (“The intensity . . . is the average inadequacy
score among the inadequate units: A = ∑ 𝑐 𝐼 (𝑐 ≥ 𝑘) where I(.) is an identification
function that assumes the value one if the condition between parentheses is true for unit i, and
zero otherwise.”); Alkire & Foster, supra note 94, at 477-80; see also Coleman & Vaz, supra
note 20, at 255-59 (“By ‘intensity of inadequacy,’ we mean the average proportion of
insufficiencies faced by inadequate units simultaneously.”); OXFORD POVERTY & HUMAN
DEV. INITIATIVE, supra note 109.
111. See Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 258 (“The . . . adjusted headcount ratio[],
denoted M0, reflects the incidence of inadequacy adjusted for the intensity:
M0 = HA or M0 = ∑ 𝑐 𝐼(𝑐 ≥ 𝑘).”); Alkire, Roche & Vaz, supra note 94, at 233.
112. Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 258; see Alkire & Foster, supra note 94, at
477-80.
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Adjusted Headcount Ratio may capture the impact of policies reducing
the quantum of inadequate units or improving the position of such
units.113 The Adjusted Headcount Ratio is the inadequacy index of
interest.
Once the Adjusted Headcount Ratio (or inadequacy index of
interest) is calculated, several additional analyses may be made.114 First,
estimating the “censored” and “uncensored” headcount ratios reveals the
pattern of insufficiencies in the population.115 Uncensored headcount
ratios “summarize the prevalence of the different insufficiencies among
the population.”116 Censored headcount ratios may also be interesting,
however, “in that they summarize the prevalence of insufficiencies
experienced by only the inadequate units.”117 Second, the percentage
contribution may be calculated.118 This entails breaking down the
measure by contribution of each dimension and indicator, which reveals
the drivers of inadequacy.119 An indicator or dimension that has a large
relative contribution could become a policy priority.120 Third, and
finally, decomposed results may be analyzed.121 The M0 may be
decomposed by subgroups, such as by unit size or location of units.122

113. Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 258-59 (“For example, suppose a policy was
successful at reducing the number of insufficiencies experienced by a set of highly inadequate
units, but such policy failed to make any inadequate unit adequate. A measure focused only
on incidence would fail to reveal the value of such policy, but the [Adjusted Headcount Ratio]
would capture it.”).
114. Possible calculations not relevant for the current Article are not here discussed.
115. See ALKIRE ET AL., supra note 94, at 165-67; Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 259,
261.
116. Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 259 (“The uncensored headcount ratio of indicator
j, denoted hj, is the proportion of units that are insufficient in that indicator: hj = ∑ 𝑔 .”).
117. Id. (emphasis added) (“The censored headcount ratio of indicator j, denoted
hj(k) = ∑ 𝑔 𝐼(𝑐 ≥ 𝑘).”).
118. See ALKIRE ET AL., supra note 94, at 166, 186-87; Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20,
at 259-61.
119. See ALKIRE ET AL., supra note 94, at 166, 186-87; Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20,
at 259-60. Since the Adjusted Headcount Ratio “can be written as the weighted sum of the
censored headcount ratios (M0 = ∑ 𝑤 ℎ (𝑘)), the relative contribution of an indicator is
obtained by multiplying the indicator’s censored headcount ratio by the indicator’s weight and
dividing by the [Adjusted Headcount Ratio].” Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 260.
120. Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 260.
121. See Alkire & Foster, supra note 94, at 480; see ALKIRE ET AL., supra note 94, at
186-87; Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 260-61.
122. See ALKIRE ET AL., supra note 94, at 184; Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 260
(“Suppose the population can be divided into m exhaustive and mutually exclusive subgroups,
M0l is the [Adjusted Headcount Ratio] for subgroup l and vl denotes the population share of
such group. Then, the [Adjusted Headcount Ratio] can be expressed as the weighted sum of
the subgroups’ [Adjusted Headcount Ratios]: M0 = ∑ 𝑣 M0l.”). Note, if the unit of
identification were individuals rather than entities, other types of subgroup decomposition
might be possible, such as by race or gender. Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 260.
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Having subgroup-level results may permit targeting resources to those
groups most in need.123
C. Construction of the Police Body Camera Infrastructure Index
Construction of the BCII followed the steps set out in Part III.B.
These steps were: (i) determining the measure’s purpose; (ii) adopting a
unit of identification; (iii) setting indicators, dimensions, and weights;
(iv) establishing insufficiency and inadequacy cutoffs; and (v)
calculating the measure.124
The first and second steps were
accomplished by determining that the BCII’s purpose would be to
measure inadequacy in BWC infrastructure among local law
enforcement agencies in the United States and by setting the Local
Agencies as the unit of identification.
Moving into the third and fourth steps, seven indicators based on
LEMAS Study questions were selected for inclusion in the measure.
Such indicators were identified by drawing upon the body camera
benefits and concerns literature referenced in Part II.B and comparing
guidance from such literature to functional data available in the LEMAS
Study. Each of the seven indicators was assigned an insufficiency cutoff
and equal weight, and such indicators were sorted into three dimensions
of BWC infrastructure: “Deployment,” “Policies and Procedures,” and
“Features and Usefulness.” Table 1 summarizes these parameters.
The Deployment dimension consisted of two indicators. First, the
“Degree of Deployment” indicator identified as insufficient any agencies
not describing their current state of BWC deployment as at least
“[c]omplete deployment for some assignments/partial deployment in
others.”125 For instance, those agencies offering “[f]ull deployment to
all intended personnel” would be considered sufficient, but those merely
engaged in “[e]xploratory/pilot deployment” or “[p]artial deployment”
would be considered insufficient.126 Second, the “Cameras Per Sworn
Officers” indicator deemed insufficient agencies with less than one
BWC per every three “full-time sworn officers with general arrest

123. Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 260 (“Combining the subgroup decomposition
with the breakdown by indicators permits display of the composition of inadequacy by each
subgroup.”).
124. The fifth step (calculation of the measure) is treated in Part IV (on empirical results
of the measure) rather than here.
125. Based on question 13 (“How would you describe the current state of body-worn
camera deployment in your agency?”) in the LEMAS Study. LEMAS STUDY, supra note 86,
at 25-26.
126. See id.
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powers.”127 This dimension was included on the assumption that a
sufficient degree of camera deployment is important to support an
adequate BWC program.
The Policies and Procedures dimension was made up of two
indicators. First, the “Formal Policy” indicator considered insufficient
agencies lacking a formal policy on BWCs or footage recorded by such
cameras.128 Second, the “Internal Access Procedure” indicator deemed
insufficient agencies who fail to track internal access to video files.129
This dimension was included on the assumption that sufficient policies
and procedures are important to support an adequate BWC program.
The Features and Usefulness dimension was made up of three
indicators. First, the “Features” indicator considered insufficient
agencies who identify their BWCs as having less than four of the ten
features inquired into by the LEMAS Study: “Time / date stamp,”
“Variable camera placement (e.g., eyewear, lapel, other part of
uniform),” “Pre-event video buffer (e.g., the device continuously records
video which is saved when the device is activated),” “Capable of
recording in low light conditions,” “Playback screen,” “Minimum
battery life,” “Global Positioning System (GPS) information,”
“Safeguards against inadvertent video file corruption, loss, or
tampering,” “Officer down alerts,” and “Officer event tagging.”130
127. Based on questions 8 (“[A]pproximate number of full-time sworn officers with
general arrest powers . . . ?”) and 12 (“About how many body-worn cameras are currently in
service?”) in the LEMAS Study. LEMAS STUDY, supra note 86, at 14-15, 23-25 (suggesting
responses may be based on approximations).
128. Based on question 19 (“Does your agency have a formal policy on the use of bodyworn cameras or the video footage recorded by those cameras?”) in the LEMAS Study.
LEMAS STUDY, supra note 86, at 47. This does not include those agencies who reported
having a policy that was under development or in draft form. Id. Since the Formal Policy
indicator merely tracks whether Local Agencies have a formal policy, it was initially
considered to include a separate indicator seeking to track the quality of such policies. This
other indicator would have been based on questions 20 (“Were any published guidelines from
independent sources (such as the NIJ, BJA, PERF, IACP, CALEA, etc.) used in the
formulation of policies and procedures regarding body-worn camera deployment, use, or
video storage?”), 21 (“Does your agency’s body-worn camera (or related) policy cover what
events to record?”), and 23 (“Does your agency’s body-worn camera (or related) policy cover
transfer, storage, or disposal of video?”) in the LEMAS Study. Id. at 47-56 (underlining
omitted). The considered “policy quality” indicator was ultimately excluded, since nearly all
Local Agencies satisfying the Formal Policy indicator would have also satisfied the policy
quality indicator. Accordingly, had such indicator been included, it would have effectively
double-weighted the policy indicator to the detriment of other important indicators in the
measure.
129. Based on question 53 (“Does your agency keep a log of or otherwise track internal
(i.e., law enforcement agency staff) access to video files?”) in the LEMAS Study. Id. at 92.
130. Based on question 51 in the LEMAS Study. Id. at 80-87. Please note, the “Other
(please specify)” answer choice was ignored for purposes of the Features indicator, since it
was selected very few times and responses would have been difficult to standardize.

2022]

MEASURING POLICE BODY CAMERA INFRASTRUCTURE

299

Second, the “Perceived Usefulness” indicator identified as insufficient
agencies who report that they “[s]trongly disagree” with any of a series
of BWC satisfaction questions in the LEMAS Study: BWCs “provide
reliable evidence of officer-citizen interactions,” “have been useful in
protecting officers from unwarranted complaints,” “have been a useful
tool for supervising officers,” “have improved professionalism of
officers,” “have helped identify instances of officer misconduct that
might not have been identified without them,” and “have improved
relationships between the agency and the community.”131 Third, the
“Use in Training” indicator identified as insufficient those agencies not
using BWC footage to develop and/or inform in-service training.132 This
dimension was included on the assumption that BWCs should have
sufficient features and be sufficiently useful in order to support an
adequate BWC program.
Table 1 – BCII: Dimensions, Indicators, Cutoffs, and Weights133
Dimension

Deployment

Policies and
Procedures

Indicator

Cutoff (Insufficient if”)

Degree of
Deployment

Has not deployed to at least
“[c]omplete deployment for
some assignments/partial
deployment in others” level
Has less than one BWC per
every three “full-time sworn
officers with general arrest
powers”

Cameras Per
Sworn Officers

Weight (%)

14.29

14.29

Formal Policy

Lacks formal policy on BWCs
or footage recorded by BWCs

14.29

Internal Access
Procedure

Fails to track internal access to
video files

14.29

131. Based on question 52 in the LEMAS Study. Id. at 88-92. Respondent agencies are
presented answer choices including: “Strongly agree,” “Agree,” “Disagree,” and “Strongly
disagree.” Id. These four answer choices are “analogous to a four-point Likert-type scale,”
and the additional two answer choices—“Too soon to know” and “Don’t know”—are ignored
for purposes of the measure. Id.; Coleman, supra note 16, at 1376 n.84; Natalie Todak &
Janne E. Gaub, Predictors of Police Body-Worn Camera Acceptance: Digging Deeper into
Officers’ Perceptions, 43 POLICING 299, 303 (2019); Scott W. Phillips et al., The Impact of
General Police Officer Outlooks on Their Attitudes Toward Body-Worn Cameras, 43
POLICING 451, 456 (2020).
132. Based on question 18 (“Does your agency use body-worn camera footage to inform
and/or develop in-service training?”) in the LEMAS Study. LEMAS STUDY, supra note 86,
at 46-47.
133. Quotations in the text are derived from survey questions in the LEMAS Study. See
supra Part III.C.
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Features

Features and
Usefulness

Has less than four of ten features
inquired into by LEMAS Study
“Strongly disagree[s]” as to
satisfaction on any of series of
BWC satisfaction questions in
LEMAS Study

Perceived
Usefulness

Use in Training

Does not use BWC footage to
develop and/or inform in-service
training

[Vol:62
14.29

14.29

14.29

IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This Part reports findings from the BCII analysis. Study limitations
and robustness are also treated.
A. Findings
Analysis of the BCII reveals both an overall inadequacy picture and
a granular view of the factors constituting the inadequacy.134 To begin,
the incidence, intensity, and BCII—i.e., the Adjusted Headcount Ratio
or M0—are estimated. These values and their 95% confidence intervals
are presented in Table 2. The incidence reflects that 32.7% of the Local
Agencies are inadequate. The intensity shows that inadequate Local
Agencies are insufficient, on average, in 53.5% of indicators,
corresponding to nearly four of the seven indicators. The BCII is 0.175,
meaning the total insufficiencies which are experienced by inadequate
Local Agencies corresponds to roughly 17.5% of all possible
insufficiencies (if all Local Agencies were insufficient in all indicators).
These aggregate figures may provide an overall view of the Local
Agencies’ inadequacy in BWC infrastructure. They may be used, for
instance, to inform federal policy-makers as to status across the country.
Table 2 – Incidence, Intensity, and BCII
Cutoff (k) = 42%

Value

Confidence Interval (95%)

Incidence (H, %)
Intensity (A, %)

32.7
53.5

29.8
52.0

35.7
54.9

BCII (M0)

0.175

0.158

0.191

It is then possible to estimate insufficiencies that are driving
inadequacy in the Local Agencies. To begin, the indicators’ censored

134. Presentation of the findings here largely follows the format of Coleman & Vaz, supra
note 20.
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headcount ratios are examined.135 These censored headcount ratios are
depicted in Figure 1 and appear in the darker color. Such censored
headcount ratios are interesting because they “focus only on the
insufficiencies experienced by inadequate agencies, rather than the
insufficiencies among all agencies.”136 The uncensored headcount
ratios, or insufficiencies among all agencies, are also depicted in Figure
1 and appear in the lighter color.137 From the uncensored headcount
ratios, it is clear that, for instance, less than 8% of the Local Agencies
are insufficient in the Perceived Usefulness indicator, but close to half
of such agencies (46.1%) are insufficient in the Use in Training
indicator. If a policy-maker were looking for a way to improve the BWC
infrastructure of Local Agencies, such policy-maker might want to target
resources toward encouraging the use of BWCs in
in-service training and divert resources away from improving
perceptions of BWC usefulness. However, if that same policy-maker
were most interested in improving the situation of agencies that are
inadequate in BWC infrastructure overall, the censored headcount ratios
might show that, for instance, targeting resources toward encouraging
the use of BWCs in in-service training would not help that much more
than targeting those same resources toward encouraging adoption of a
formal BWC policy.

135. See supra Part III.B.
136. Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 266.
137. Id. at 266-67.
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Figure 1 – Censored and Uncensored Headcount Ratios

Another means of seeking to isolate the drivers of inadequacy
among the Local Agencies is quantifying the relative contribution of
individual indicators to the BCII.138 This is summarized in Figure 2.
Similar to the findings above, the indicators with the highest contribution
to the BCII are Use in Training (21.1%) and Formal Policy (18.7%),
while Perceived Usefulness has the lowest contribution (3.3%). Again,
these percentages may inform policy-makers as to where best to deploy
resources.

138. See id. at 267; supra Part III.B.
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Figure 2 – Percentage Contribution of Each Indicator to BCII

In addition to analyses of all Local Agencies studied, it is also
possible to examine the positions of particular subgroups of Local
Agencies. For instance, Figures 3 and 4 depict the BCII and incidence
of inadequacy, respectively, by agency size, along with relevant 95%
confidence intervals. It appears that, on average, Local Agencies with
less than ten officers have higher inadequacy than those agencies with
twenty-five or more officers. While it may be understandable that larger
agencies might tend to have more BWC infrastructure—due to, for
instance, economies of scale—it is still helpful for a policy-maker to
know that smaller agencies might generally need more support than
larger agencies.
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Figure 4 – Incidence of Inadequacy by Agency Size

It is also possible to analyze the percentage contribution of each
indicator to the BCII by agency size, as depicted in Figure 5. As Figure
5 reflects, there is a large variation in percentage contribution across
different agency sizes. For example, the percentage contribution of the
indicator Cameras Per Sworn Officers varies between 26.4% for
agencies with fifty or more officers and 4.7% for agencies with less than
ten officers. The percentage contribution of Degree of Deployment and
Cameras Per Sworn Officers generally appears to increase as agency size
increases. In contrast, the percentage contribution of Internal Access
Procedures and Perceived Usefulness generally appears to decrease as
the size of the agency increases.139 It may be that larger agencies
generally need more cameras and greater investment in deployment than
smaller agencies, while smaller agencies are less likely than larger
agencies to need formal policies and procedures. Since the profile of
insufficiencies varies across different agency sizes, a local government
seeking to improve the BWC infrastructure of agencies in its area might

139. These observations are simply descriptive. and it is unclear whether they are
statistically significant.
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decide to take a different approach depending on the size of such
agencies. For instance, if an agency had over fifty officers, making an
investment in the number of cameras per sworn officers and/or degree
of deployment of such cameras might improve the agency’s position. In
contrast, if an agency had less than ten officers, it might be better to
invest in using the camera footage in in-service training, adopting a
formal BWC policy, and/or tracking internal access to the video.
Figure 5 – Percentage Contribution of Each Indicator to BCII by
Agency Size

In addition to agency differences based on size, there may also be
important differences based on agency location. Figures 6, 7, and 8
depict the BCII, incidence of inadequacy, and intensity of inadequacy,
respectively, in the ten largest U.S. states, along with relevant 95%
confidence intervals.140 In each of these figures, states are reflected in
descending order of the index depicted, and it is unfortunately not
possible to determine whether state-level differences are statistically
significant.141 As Figure 6 reflects, agency inadequacy appears to vary
140. See 2020 Resident Population for the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial/2020/
data/apportionment/apportionment-2020-map02.pdf (last visited July 7, 2021); The 50 US
States Ranked By Population, WORLDATLAS, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/us-statesby-population.html (last visited July 7, 2021); US States - Ranked by Population 2022,
WORLD POPULATION REV., https://worldpopulationreview.com/states (last visited Feb. 8,
2022).
141. The inability to determine statistical significance is primarily due to the small size of
the states’ samples.
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across states, with, for instance, agencies in Pennsylvania and Illinois
experiencing higher inadequacy on average than those in Texas or
California. Agencies in states with higher inadequacy like Pennsylvania
could, in theory and on average, need more support from policy-makers
in order to reach the level of agencies in better-performing states like
Texas. As Figures 7 and 8 reflect, however, the rank of these same ten
states by incidence or intensity can be quite different than the rank based
on BCII. For instance, Florida has the lowest incidence of inadequacy
(Figure 7), the highest intensity of inadequacy (Figure 8), and a BCII
(Figure 6) closer to the middle of the ten states. This finding may suggest
that while the proportion of inadequate agencies in Florida is lower than
in the other nine states, the average share of insufficiencies among
inadequate agencies in Florida is higher than the average share of
insufficiencies among inadequate agencies in the other states. Other
states, like Texas, generally do not change much in terms of rank order
across Figures 6, 7, and 8. The state-level ranked results should be
viewed with these possible variations in mind.
Figure 6 – BCII in Ten Largest U.S. States
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Figure 7 – Incidence of Inadequacy in Ten Largest U.S. States

Figure 8 – Intensity of Inadequacy in Ten Largest U.S. States
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The percentage contribution of each indicator to the BCII in the ten
largest U.S. states is depicted in Figure 9. Figure 9 can help
policy-makers in each state target resources toward items that will most
efficiently improve the position of Local Agencies in their state. For
instance, a policy-maker in New York might want to expend resources
on improving the degree of BWC deployment (which contributes 25%
to the BCII in New York) and less on other items, such as adopting a
formal BWC policy (which contributes 16% to the BCII in New York).
The exact opposite might be the case in Georgia, where the Degree of
Deployment indicator contributes only 9% to the BCII, but the Formal
Policy indicator contributes 27% to the BCII. Figure 9 also shows that
there seem to be certain commonalities across the ten states. For
instance, none need be particularly concerned with improving their
agencies’ performance on the Perceived Usefulness indicator.
Figure 9 – Percentage Contribution of Each Indicator to BCII in
Ten Largest U.S. States

Policy-makers may utilize the aggregated and decomposed results
from analysis of the BCII to confirm the inadequacy of BWC
infrastructure in relevant agencies, diagnose what factor(s) are driving
any such inadequacy, and target resources to areas likely to improve
agencies’ positions. Importantly, the Adjusted Headcount Ratio
framework is flexible. Policy-makers or other stakeholders may adapt
the BCII to fit individual measurement needs by choosing their own
indicators, dimensions, cutoffs, and weights.
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B. Limitations & Robustness
The findings from the analysis of the BCII are subject to several
limitations, a number of which are emphasized here.142 First, data
limitations restricted inputs for the measure. In particular, not all
available data that would have been helpful for constructing indicators
was available in the LEMAS Study. For instance, it would have been
helpful to: (a) have been able to better control for Local Agency
resources; (b) have had data from additional questions on specifics of
policies, procedures, features, and usefulness; (c) have had the ability to
decompose data for additional subgroups; and (d) have had additional
observations for certain survey questions that were included.143 Any
limitations reported for the LEMAS Study itself would also apply to the
BCII, which used the LEMAS Study’s data as inputs.144 Second, there
are measurement limitations. The Adjusted Headcount Ratio framework
is—like any measurement framework of its kind—imperfect, and it may
be that the BCII or given indicators failed to accurately measure what
they purported to measure.145 Third, and finally, there are subjectivity
limitations. Some degree of subjectivity is implicit in selecting
indicators and dimensions, assigning indicator weights, and setting
relevant cutoffs. It may be that the BCII failed to incorporate the optimal
set of parameters and values. Similarly, the indicators were constructed
from the responses of the Local Agencies only, so the indicators may
merely reflect the subjective beliefs of the responding law enforcement
employees rather than that of the full agencies or other important societal
stakeholders.146
The findings presented in this Article have also been subjected to
two checks for robustness. First, to help reveal the sensitivity of the
ranking by agency size to different inadequacy cutoffs, Figures 10 and
11 present the inadequacy and incidence of inadequacy, respectively, by

142. Several of these limitations are analogous to those noted in Coleman, supra note 16,
at 1389-90.
143. See Coleman, supra note 16, at 1389. The limitation in available data is not a
criticism of the LEMAS Study’s data collection, since there are good reasons to limit the
quantum of questions, such that burdensome and lengthy surveys may be avoided. See id.;
Phillips et al., supra note 131, at 462.
144. LEMAS STUDY, supra note 86, at 5-6.
145. See Alkire, Roche & Vaz, supra note 94, at 232 (discussing application of measure
in the poverty context).
146. See Jordan C. Pickering, Officers’ Perceptions Regarding the Unexpected Effects of
Body-Worn Cameras, 43 POLICING 390, 400 (2020); see also Coleman, supra note 16, at 1391
(discussing value of objective metrics). Please note, Figures 10-13 are presented as lines for
visual purposes, but they are made up of a discrete set of data points, so they are really more
like “steps” than lines.
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agency size for different cutoffs (i.e., for different values of k).147 These
figures reveal that there is some sensitivity to what cutoff is selected, but
the two smaller agency size subgroups appear to generally stay on one
side, while the two larger agency size subgroups appear to generally stay
on the other. This suggests that regardless of cutoff, size appears to
matter.
Figure 10 – BCII by Agency Size for Different Inadequacy Cutoffs

147. See Coleman & Vaz, supra note 20, at 270 (noting importance of checking
sensitivity of results to changes in selected parameters).
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Figure 11 – Incidence of Inadequacy by Agency Size for Different
Inadequacy Cutoffs

Second, and for similar reasons, Figures 12 and 13 reflect the
inadequacy and incidence of inadequacy, respectively, in the ten largest
U.S. states for various possible cutoffs. The ranking of states is sensitive
to the cutoff selected, so results should be interpreted with that in mind.
Florida is, again, a particularly interesting case in this regard. For the
lowest levels of k, Florida is ranked close to the middle of the ten states,
while for the highest levels of k, it becomes the state with the highest
level of inadequacy. Importantly, if a policy-maker wanted to use a
different cutoff than that selected by this Article, the BCII could
accommodate that, and the BCII could simply be adapted to fit such
policy-maker’s individual preferences.
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Figure 13 – Incidence of Inadequacy in Ten Largest U.S. States for
Different Inadequacy Cutoffs

V. CONCLUSION
The goal of this Article is to present a measure of police body
camera infrastructure—the BCII—and offer findings from analysis of it
that will aid policy-makers, local stakeholders, and future researchers.
Important limitations notwithstanding, the BCII appears to be the first
multidimensional measure of its kind, and it provides both an overall and
decomposed picture of inadequacy among local law enforcement
agencies in the United States.
There are multiple avenues for future research in this area, certain
of which are suggested here. First, it would be helpful to have additional
large-N datasets on BWC programs. Robust data from a great variety of
questions would allow for more precision in selecting indicators and
dimensions. Second, it would be helpful to have new datasets that
include perceptions of stakeholders other than law enforcement
personnel, such as citizens, jurors, and attorneys.148 Third, it would be
helpful for future large-N datasets on law enforcement personnel to

148. See Coleman, supra note 16, at 1391.
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include data decomposable by subgroups, such as gender, race, or
disability status.149 Fourth, it would be helpful to have additional
multidimensional measures of BWC infrastructure using the M0 or other
techniques. The use of different measurement approaches may help
confirm the findings of the BCII. Fifth, if sufficient data were available,
it would be interesting to analyze the changes in BWC infrastructure
inadequacy over time.150 For example, how have Local Agencies’
infrastructures altered since 2014 when Michael Brown and Eric Garner
died, and how have or will the Local Agencies’ infrastructures be altered
following the more recent deaths of George Floyd and others? Sixth,
and finally, if findings from the BCII induce implementation of any
concrete policies at the state or local level, it would be interesting to see
experimental data on the outcomes and impacts of such policies.
Whether or not these six specific avenues are explored, it is hoped that
this Article will at least spur continued research into BWC programs and
highlight the value of measurement in constructing, assessing, and
updating them.

149. Id.
150. See generally Alkire, Roche & Vaz, supra note 94.

